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The ”portfolio eﬀect theory” developed by the European Commission in merger
control is at the center of a ﬁerce international row with the US authorities who
believe that this theory has no economic foundations.
This paper aims to provide a counter-argument and shows that full-line forcing
may be used by the holder a comprehensive range of products as an entry deterrence
device to maintain its monopoly power. However, due to buyer power on the retail
m a r k e t ,t h i sw i l lh a p p e no n l yi fe n t r yi sn o tp r o ﬁtable for the industry as a whole.
The eﬀects on consumer welfare are ambiguous. Full-line forcing will reduce
prices in the ﬁrst period, but as it helps maintaining monopoly power, is harmful
in the long-term.
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The European Commission’s decision in July 2001 to prohibit the proposed merger be-
tween General Electric and Honeywell has been the starting point of the ﬁerce debate
between the European and the U.S. competition authorities on the theory of ”portfolio
power” in conglomerate mergers. One of the motivations behind the decision was that
”because of the lack of ability to match the bundled oﬀers, rival component suppliers
would lose market shares to the beneﬁt of the merged entity.(...) As a result, the merger
is likely to lead to market foreclosure on those existing aircraft platforms and subsequently
to the elimination, or a the substantial lessening of competition.”1
This ”portfolio power” approach has ﬁrst been introduced in 1996-97 by the European
Commission in three major merger cases. It is worth noting that the U.S. authorities
already rejected this theory at that time. One of the conclusions in the Guinness / Grand
Metropolitan case (hereafter GMG)2 was that, despite the lack of increase in market
share in some individual product markets, the existence of such a portfolio may create or
strengthen a dominant position.3 The GMG decision clearly deﬁnes some of the beneﬁts
that the holder of a comprehensive portfolio may enjoy: economies of scale and scope
in marketing activities, stronger position vis-` a-vis its customers (the seller now accounts
for a larger proportion of the buyer’s turnover), and greater potential for tying or other
bundling techniques. As denoted by Giotakos (1998), ”the anti-competitive likelihood of
portfolio eﬀects is based on the proposition that the combined portfolio of products/brands
of the merged ﬁrm represents an essential facility for the downstream agents in a manner
that the individual product lines of the undertakings pre-merger did not”. The holder of
a complete line of products could for example impose exclusive contracts on the retailers
or force them to buy the complete line (full-line forcing). The anti-competitive eﬀects
of this behavior are twofold. Firstly, the portfolio can be used to ”reposition relatively
weaker brands within the portfolio against the brands of the competitors at the same
level of quality”. In other words, the holder of the portfolio can try to impose brands
that the retailer would otherwise not be willing to buy. The second aspect is the possible
foreclosure eﬀect. The complete range of products can be used to take up more space on
1See Giotakos et al. (2001) for a detailled presentation of the GE / Honeywell decision.
2Guinness / Grand Metropolitan (case IV/M.938). See also Coca-Cola / Amalgamated Beverages
(case IV/M.796) and Coca-Cola / Carlsberg (case IV/M.833).
3Other possible sources of ”portfolio power” have been identiﬁed by the European Commission in
these cases: see Lexecon (1998) and OECD (2002) for a more comprehensive presentation of this theory.
2the retailers’ shelves in order to limit the space available to competitors and force them
out of the market. This paper focuses on this second aspect.
However, the Commission’s argument have been widely criticized. In its contribution
to an OECD Best Practices Roundtable,4 the U.S. Department of Justice made clear
that they did not believe in this theory and that they were ”very concerned that the
range eﬀects theory of competitive injury that is gaining currency in certain jurisdictions
places the interests of competitors ahead of those of consumers and will lead to blocking
or deterring pro-competitive, eﬃciency-enhancing mergers.” They then argued that the
Commission’s arguments have no serious economic basis and are based on some predictions
that the merger would drive competitors of the new entity out of the market which have
no empirical or historical foundations.
It has to be acknowledged, that although there exists a thorough literature on the
eﬀects of tying and bundling, the economic theory of ”portfolio power” itself is fairly
limited. Rabassa (1999) proposes a ﬁrst attempt to provide a formal argument in favor of
this theory which are not related to tying. In a setup in which competing ﬁrms produce
and sell diﬀerent brands and where demand takes into account preferences for quality and
variety (number of products available), she analyzes the horizontal eﬀe c t so fam e r g e ro n
price and quality levels. She shows that when quality is a short run decision and therefore
producers are able to modify the quality of their products after a merger, merger may
have anti-competitive eﬀects and may decrease consumers’ surplus. She also shows that
the post-merger market share of the new ﬁrm is higher than the pre-merger combined
market share of the merging parties, thereby conﬁrming the theory that a wider portfolio
creates sur-additivity. However, this model considers direct interaction between producers
and ﬁnal consumers and only focuses on horizontal eﬀects.
Diﬀerent arguments, such has price discrimination and cost-savings have been provided
to justify the use of tie-in sales or full-line forcing.5,6 However, arguments more closely
related to the ”portfolio power” and the interactions between the merged entity and its
competitor refers to the analysis of the market power aspects of tying. This literature
4See OECD (2002).
5Tying/bundling usually refers to goods that are used in ﬁxed proportions (usually complementary
goods), whereas full-line forcing refers to situation in which a consumer (usually a wholesaler or a retailer)
is forced to buy the whole set of products proposed by a manufacturer.
6S e ef o re x a m p l eA d a m sa n dY e l l e n( 1976) or Mathewson and Winter (1997) for price discrimination
issues, and Slade (1998) for cost-savings motives.
3started with the long debate on the leverage theory: the intuition is that a multi-product
monopolist may try to extend the monopoly power that he has in the tying-good market
to eliminate competition in, or at least to extract additional monopoly rent from, the tied-
good market. However this theory has been widely contested by the so-called Chicago
School on the grounds that a monopoly proﬁt can only be taken once. An important
contribution by Whinston (1990) shows that the criticism are based on the assumption
that ﬁrms operate under constant returns to scale and that market power leverage may
proﬁtably occur if there are economies of scale.
More recently, a literature mostly inspired by the Microsoft case has developed on the
dynamic eﬀects of tying (dynamic leveraging). The idea is that a ﬁrm who has monopoly
power on one market may want to reduce competition on related market in order to
protect its monopoly power in the tying market or to extend it to the tied market. This
theory has ﬁrst been developed by Nalebuﬀ (1999, 2000). Tying might now be harmful
for the buyers because it limits the proﬁtability of entry and thus reduces competition in
the long term. A similar argument has been developed by Carlton and Waldman (2002).
The basic framework is one in which a ﬁrm has monopoly power on two complementary
markets but faces a threat of entry on one market at each period of the game. If the
monopoly ties-in the sales of its two components it can prevent entry in both market and
preserve its monopoly position: the idea is that entry can be proﬁtable only if a ﬁrm is
able to enter in both market at the same time since one component alone has no value
for the consumers.7
Our paper extends this approach to the case of imperfectly substitutable products.
We try to address the question of whether a multi-product ﬁrm, holding a comprehensive
portfolio of brands and acting as a monopolist in one market, may force the retailers to
buy the full range of products in order to raise barriers to entry and ensure that he will
always remain alone in the monopolized market. Since product are substitutes and not
perfect complements, a single ﬁrm could thus enter one market only and still make proﬁt.
However, ﬁrms have to deal with a unique retailer to access the ﬁnal consumer: therefore,
although the two goods are seen as substitutes for the ﬁnal consumers they oﬀer some
complementarities for the retailer who needs to provide them both in its shelves.
This relates our papers to Shaﬀer (1991) and Verg´ e (2001) on the eﬀects of full-line
7Using a similar framework ,Choi and Stefanidis (2001) shows that tying reduces the incentives for
innovation thereby protecting the monopolist position.
4forcing: Shaﬀer (1991) provides a ﬁrst attempt to analyze full-line forcing in a vertical
relationship between a multi-product monopolist and a unique retailer. An upstream
monopolist selling diﬀerentiated products (imperfect substitutes) faces the retailer’s bar-
gaining power due to the opportunity cost of brand carrying (for example, the value of
the shelf space). If this opportunity cost is common knowledge, brand-speciﬁct w o - t a r i ﬀs
are not suﬃcient to maximize the manufacturer’s proﬁt and the retailer earns a strictly
positive proﬁt even though the producer can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. This pos-
itive rent is attributable to shelf space scarcity but also to the retailer’s discretion over
brand choice. Shaﬀer also shows that full-line forcing (as with other vertical restraints
like resale price maintenance or aggregate rebates) is a possible tool to avoid discretion of
brand choice and therefore remove retailer’s rent. However, this model does not account
for competition between producers and therefore it cannot be used as such to analyze po-
tential non-horizontal eﬀects of portfolio power. Using a similar framework, Verg´ e (2001)
shows that full-line forcing has a positive impact on consumers’ surplus. In the absence
of tie-in sales, the producer prefers to maintain prices above the monopoly level in order
to reduce the retailer’s rents. Full-line forcing allows the producer to fully restore its
monopoly power and eliminate price distortions.
In a similar way to Carlton and Waldman, we assume that entry occurs ﬁrst on the
potentially tied market before occurring on the monopolized market. This plays a critical
role in our model: the idea is that consumers are always sceptical when they see new
products and prefer to stick with the well-known brands. A newcomer must therefore
start losing money on a highly-competitive market before being able to gain reputation
and compete with the established brand. If signalling is impossible the incumbent may
want to tie-in the sales of the two products to prevent the entry of a newcomer and
maintain its monopoly position in the future.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the features of our dynamic
model with the threat of entry. Once we have analyzed the possible second period equi-
libria (section 3), we analyze the rationale for full-line forcing. We ﬁrst show that the
incumbent producer cannot maintain its monopoly position without holding a compre-
hensive portfolio (section 4). We then show that full-line forcing can be used to prevent
e n t r yb u tt h a ti ti sp r o ﬁtable only when entry would decrease the industry proﬁt( s e c t i o n
5). The eﬀects on the consumer surplus are presented in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
52T h e M o d e l
2.1 Goods and Consumers
We consider an economy in which two imperfectly substitutable goods, denoted H and L,
are available. The inverse demand functions for goods H and L are denoted PH (qH,q L)
and PL (qH,q L). Products H and L being imperfect substitutes, the two inverse demands
are decreasing functions of both qH and qL. Although this assumption is not necessary, we
suppose that for equal quantities, the consumers’ willingness to pay is higher for product
H (PH (q,q) ≥ PL (q,q)). This speciﬁcation allows us to consider this product as the most
important and potentially more proﬁtable. H can thus be seen as being the well-known
or branded good, whereas L is the non-branded or generic good. We will hereafter refer
to market for products H and L as the high- and low- demand markets respectively.
Let us denote by π(qH,q L;wH,w L) the proﬁtt h a tam o n o p o l i s tp r o d u c i n gt h et w o
goods at constant marginal costs wH and wL would realize if it sells quantities qH and
qL,that is:
π (qH,q L;wH,w L)=( PH (qH,q L) − wH)qH +( PL(qH,q L) − wL)qL
We assume that, for any value of wH and wL,t h i sp r o ﬁt function is strictly concave in
(qH,q L) and therefore reaches its maximum for a unique pair of quantities, qM
H (wH,w L)
and qM
L (wH,w L). We also denote by pM
H (wH,w L)a n dpM
L (wH,w L)t h eo p t i m a lp r i c e s
on markets H and L,a n db yπM(wH,w L) the proﬁt made by the monopolist. Due to
the concavity assumption, qM
i (i = H,L)i si n c r e a s i n gi nwi and decreasing in wj (j 6= i),
whereas the proﬁt πM (wH,w L) is a decreasing function of wH and wL.
If the production cost of one product (let say wL) is too high, or if the producer cannot
propose this good, it maximizes
π(qH,0;wH,w L)=( PH (qH,0) − wH)qH.
Under our assumption, this is a concave function of qH which reaches its maximum for
a unique value of qH. We will denote by qM
H (wH,∅) this optimal quantity, by pM
H (wH,∅)
the price at which it is sold and by πM
H (wH,∅) the corresponding proﬁt. qM
L (∅,w L),
pM
L (∅,w L)a n dπM
L (∅,w L)a r ed e ﬁn e di nas i m i l a rw a y . 8
8Notice that in these cases we have: qM
L (wH,∅)=qM
H (∅,w L) = 0 and the prices pM
L (wH,∅)a n d
pM
H (∅,w L) are irrelevant.
6We moreover assume that the inverse demand functions are such that the prices
pM
H (wH,w L)a n dpM
L (wH,w L) are increasing function of wH and wL.9
2.2 Firms
The production sector consists of three types of ﬁrms, all of them operating under constant
returns to scale.
• Competitive Fringe
Perfectly substitutable manufacturers produce good L at the same marginal cost c.
• Incumbent (I)
The incumbent manufacturer I produces good H at a marginal cI >c .It is assumed
that it is more costly to produce good H (high demand) because it involves either
more sophisticated ingredients to improve the actual quality of the product or more
costly packaging in order to convince consumers of its higher value.
The incumbent manufacturer can also acquire the technology to produce the low-
demand good L at zero cost. One such possibility is to merge with one manufacturer
from the competitive fringe.
• Entrant (E)
Manufacturer E produces a ”new” good at marginal cost c ≤ cE ≤ cI. We assume
that the consumers’ tastes are based on experience and that they are not only
extremely risk-averse when they try a new product, but also have a strong bias
against new comers. Moreover, there is no way to signal the product’s potential
value to the consumers other than by testing it. A rational for this is the following:
consumers live only one period and do not like new products. However, if some
consumers have tried the product in the ﬁrst period, they are able to inform the
next generation of consumers about the actual type of the product. In this case, if
the entrant’s product is actually sold during one period, all second-period consumers
will be informed of the actual type of the entrant’s product and the entrant will now
access the high-demand market. If the product has never been sold before, there
9The costs wH and wL can take any value including ∅ (∅ stands for the absence of the product and
corresponds to very high values of the production cost).
7is no chance that the consumers’ tastes change and the entrant’s product is thus a
low-demand product.
We also assume that the marginal costs and the demand functions satisfy the following
conditions:
• (H1):∀cE ∈ [c,cI],the quantities qM
H (cE,c), qM
L (cE,c),q M
H (cI,c E), qM
L (cI,c E)a r e
strictly positive.10
• (H2) : If the incumbent decides not to sell its product during the ﬁrst period, the
integrated structure consisting of the entrant ancd the retailer prefers to sell the
entrant’s product rather than the competitive fringe’s low-demand product, that
is:11




Even though it is more costly to sell the entrant’s product on the low-demand
market, the beneﬁts generated during the second period are higher than the short
term losses. This hypothesis ensures that it is impossible for the incumbent I to
deter entry when it produces the high-demand good only.
2.3 Timing
The producers cannot directly sell the goods to the ﬁn a lc o n s u m e r sa n dh a v et os e l lt h e m
through a unique retailer. This distributor operates under constant returns to scale, and,
without loss of generality, we normalize the marginal distribution cost to 0. In addition,
we consider shelf space as a scarce resource and assume that the retailer can carry at
most two diﬀerent products. The producers thus have to compete in order to gain access
to this essential facility.12 The objective of this section is to analyze the incentives for
full-line forcing when the incumbent I produces the two types of goods.
10These conditions imply that qM
H (cE,∅)a n dqM
L (∅,c E)a r ep o s i t i v e . T h eﬁrst two conditions are
relatively natural since they ensure that the products are viable. The last two are not essential and just
make the presentation easier, but do not aﬀect the results.
11Notice that because πM is a decreasing function of the costs, this condition needs to hold for cE = cI
only.
12This assumption is not crucial, but allows us to avoid questions related to market sharing when
several producers oﬀe rt h es a m et a r i ﬀ.
8We analyze a two-period game in which the sequence of the events is the same for
both periods:13
1. The incumbent producer I makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the retailer.
2. The entrant E and the competitive fringe make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the re-
tailer.14
3. The retailer accepts at most two oﬀers, sets the retail prices and orders quantities
so as to satisfy demand. The contracts are enforced.
Each oﬀer made by the entrant or by one of the competitive producers (operating on
the low-demand market) is a two-part tariﬀ (w,F), where F is a ﬁxed fee paid by the
retailer in order to be allowed to resell the product and a per unit price w. The incumbent
can either sell the two products separately and thus oﬀers two product-speciﬁct w o - p a r t
tariﬀs, or sell them under a unique contract (full-line forcing) consisting of a unique ﬁxed
fee and a per unit wholesale price for each product. The oﬀers are publicly observable.
3 Second Period Equilibrium
The second period corresponds to a static situation in which competition between pro-
d u c e r si sa ﬀected by the type of products actually sold on the market during the ﬁrst
period. More speciﬁcally, it depends on whether the entrant was active or not on the
low-demand market.
3.1 The Entrant has not been active in period 1
Assume ﬁrst that the entrant’s product was not available on the retailer’s shelves during
the ﬁrst period. If the product is proposed on the shelves during the second period, it
13The two periods only diﬀer with respect to the number of active players on each market. In period
one, the incumbent acts as a monopolist on the high-demand market and faces competition from the
entrant E and the competitive fringe on the low-demand market. If the entrant is inactive on the low-
demand market during this ﬁrst period, the incumbent remains a monopolist on the high-demand market
in the second period. Otherwise, it faces competition from the entrant on this high-demand market.
14Assuming that oﬀers are made simultaneously would lead to multiple equilibria, and our equilibrium
would then correspond to the most favourable equilibrium for the incumbent. This would just reinforce
our results.
9will therefore be considered as a low quality product, that is, as a perfect substitute for
the products oﬀered by the producers of the competitive fringe. The entrant producing
at a higher cost, cE ≥ c, will thus leave the market.
This situation is thus very similar to Shaﬀer (1991) except that the low-demand market
is now perfectly competitive. Everything thus happens as if the retailer were able to
produce the low-demand product by itself at cost c. It can then decide to reject the
wholesale contract oﬀered by the incumbent, sell the low-demand product only and secure
ap r o ﬁte q u a lt oπM (∅,c).
The incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the retailer to sell its high-demand
product and possibly its low-demand product. Since the incumbent makes a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer and can oﬀer a two-part tariﬀ, it is able to recover the total industry
proﬁt through the ﬁxed fee, except for the minimal secured proﬁt πM (∅,c). The best
the incumbent can do is thus to ensure that the retailer charges prices that maximize the
total industry proﬁt. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If the entrant has not been active in the ﬁrst period, the second period equi-
librium is such that the incumbent manufacturer I charges wholesale prices equal to the












The existence of the competitive fringe on the low-demand market prevents the use
of full-line forcing and makes it pointless for the incumbent to produce the low-demand
product. This allows us to focus on the potential anti-competitive eﬀects of full-line
forcing in isolation and get rid oﬀ t h ep o s s i b l ew e l f a r ei m p r o v i n ge ﬀects of such restraints
used as a counter-eﬀect for the retailer’s ability to select the product proposed on its
shelves (in contrast to Shaﬀer(1991) and Verg´ e (2001)).
3.2 The Entrant has been active in period 1
Suppose now that the producer E was active, that is, its product was available on the
retailer’s shelves and a strictly positive quantity of this product was sold to the ﬁnal
consumers during the ﬁrst period. In period 2, the new consumers are now informed
about the value of this product and consider it as a perfect substitute for the incumbent’s
high-demand product.
10On the low-demand market, the producers of the competitive fringe are still willing
to sell their product at the marginal production cost c. On the other hand, on the high-
demand market, there is competition between an eﬃcient ﬁrm - the entrant producing
at marginal cost cE -a n dt h ei n e ﬃcient incumbent producing at marginal cost cI. Since,
the two products are perfectly substitutable, the price competition between the two ﬁrms
reduces their bargaining position vis-` a-vis the retailer, even though they are able to make
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the downstream ﬁrm. As I is now the ineﬃcient ﬁrm, every-
thing happens as if the incumbent just sells out its ﬁrm to the retailer. The retailer is
therefore able to secure a proﬁte q u a lt oπM (cI,c). The entrant will therefore ensure that
the retailer charges the industry maximizing prices (by selling its product at marginal
cost). These results are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If the entrant has been active in the ﬁrst period, the second period equilib-
rium is such that the entrant charges a wholesale price equal to its marginal product cost
(wH = cE), and sets a ﬁxed fee such that the second period proﬁts are:
π
2
I (A)=0 , π
2
E (A)=π
M (cE,c) − π




Comparison of the proﬁts in the two cases shows that the incumbent I has more to lose
(πM (cI,c)−πM (∅,c)) than the entrant has to gain
¡
πM (cE,c) − πM (cI,c)
¢
, provided that
the cost diﬀerential cI −cE is not too high. This could create incentives for the incumbent
to act strategically and distort his prices or force the retailer to buy his complete line of
products in order to ensure that the entrant is inactive in the ﬁrst period and thus protect
its monopoly position in the second period. However, the existence of the monopolist
retailer modiﬁes the incentives. It is indeed not relevant to compare the diﬀerences in
proﬁts for the incumbent and the entrant without taking the retailer into account. On the
account of its proﬁt being greater due to the competition on the high-demand market, the
retailer has incentives to ensure that the entrant is active in the ﬁrst period. The relevant
comparison is therefore between the industry proﬁts. The entrant being more eﬃcient
than the incumbent on the high-demand market implies that entry is always proﬁtable
(for the industry as a whole) in the second period. However, the entrant is less eﬃcient
than the competitive fringe on the low-demand market, hence entry decreases the ﬁrst
period joint proﬁts, and is globally proﬁtable if an only if
∆(cE) ≡ π
M (cI,c E)+π
M (cE,c) − 2π
M (cI,c) ≥ 0.
114 Equilibrium Without Portfolio Power
Let us ﬁrst assume that the incumbent produces only the high-demand good. Because,
its second period proﬁt is higher when the producer E has been active in period one,
the retailer can always decides to trade-oﬀ some of the short term proﬁtt h a tm i g h tb e
lost when entry occurs, for a higher proﬁt in the longer term due to competition on the
high-demand market. If it has not accepted the entrant’s oﬀer, it is not able to aﬀect the
future proﬁt and the retailer’s pricing decisions are thus identical to the second period
(or static) decisions. However, it is always optimal to facilitate entry if the entrant’s
oﬀer has been accepted. Moreover, even if qM
L (wI,w E)=0 , it is almost costless to sell
an inﬁnitesimal quantity of the entrant’s product, and this yields a much higher second
period proﬁt.
Given this optimal pricing policy, the producer I has two options in the ﬁrst period:
(i) either it decides to ”accommodate entry” and maximizes the proﬁt during this ﬁrst
period, with the result that it will have to quit the market during the second period as
the new entrant is now more eﬃcient on the high-demand market;
(ii) or it distorts its ﬁrst period proﬁts in order to save its monopoly position on the
high-demand market in the second period.
However, as the retailer can also increase its second period proﬁt by accepting the
entrant’s oﬀer in the ﬁrst period, entry deterrence is impossible under the assumption
(H2), as proved in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The incumbent cannot maintain its monopoly position if it produces only the
high-demand product.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If the incumbent wants to maintain
its monopoly position, it has to ensure that the retailer is never willing to sell the entrant’s
product even if it can get this product at marginal cost in any of the two periods. This
is however impossible because the retailer would have an incentive to sell an inﬁnitesimal
quantity of the entrant’s good in the ﬁrst period to increase substantially its second period
proﬁt. Although this strategy reduces its ﬁrst period proﬁt because the entrant is less
eﬃcient than the competitive fringe, hypothesis (H2) ensures that the increase in the
second period proﬁti ss u ﬃciently large to compensate the ﬁrst period loss.
12As the incumbent cannot deter entry during the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrst period situation
is a standard common agency problem in which the incumbent and the entrant deal with
t h es a m er e t a i l e rt or e a c ht h eﬁnal consumers. It is therefore optimal to charge wholesale
prices equal to the marginal production costs (wH = cI and wE = cE) to ensure that
the retailer will then set the retail prices that maximize the total industry proﬁts. Each
retailer sets its franchise fee in order to ensure that the retailer will accept its contract
in addition to the competitor’s contract. Finally, the existence of the competitive fringe
ensures that the retailer can always secure a minimal proﬁt by rejecting both oﬀers. This
leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the incumbent produces only the high-demand good, both the incumbent
I and the entrant E charge wholesale prices equal to their respective marginal production
costs, cI and cE, and franchise fees such that these two oﬀers are accepted. The inter-
temporal proﬁts are then:
- for the incumbent I : πI (A)=π1
I = πM(cI,c E) − πM(∅,c E);
- for the entrant E : πE (A)=πM(cE,c)+πM(∅,c E) − 2πM(∅,c);
- for the retailer : πR (A)=2 πM(∅,c).
Proof. See Appendix B.
This situation is a standard common agency problem except that the existence of the
competitive fringe which is more eﬃcient than the entrant on the low-demand market
(cE ≥ c), further limits the maximum ﬁxed fee the entrant can set. The incumbent I
makes the ﬁrst oﬀer and therefore obtains a proﬁt equal to the proﬁt generated by its
product
¡
πM (cI,c E) − πM (∅,c E)
¢
, whereas the entrant has to ensure that the retailer
prefers to accept its oﬀer rather than that of the competitive fringe only. It therefore has
to compensate the retailer for the loss incurred in the ﬁrst period.
5 Portfolio Power and Full-line Forcing
Assume now that the incumbent manufacturer I produces the two types of goods (H and
L)a n dc a no ﬀer, either two product-speciﬁct w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀs, or a unique tariﬀ (full-line
forcing). It is straightforward to see that, if the incumbent decides to sell its low-demand
product in the ﬁrst period in order to maintain its monopoly position on product H,
it is as least as proﬁtable to use a unique tariﬀ than it is to oﬀer two product-speciﬁc
contracts. The producer can indeed replicate the equilibrium generated with the two
13contracts (wH,F H)a n d( wL,F L), by oﬀering the unique tariﬀ (wH,w L,F H+FL). Moreover,
full-line forcing allows to relax one of the constraints on the maximum franchise fees that
the incumbent can set because it does not need to ensure that the retailer chooses its
low-demand product rather than the entrant’s.15
If the incumbent makes a unique oﬀer, it has to ensure that the retailer is willing to
accept it even though the entrant would then be ready to give up its technology to the
distributor. Under hypothesis (H2), the proﬁt the retailer can secure (that is the proﬁt
it would realize if it rejects the incumbent’s oﬀer) is πR = πM (∅,c E)+πM (cE,c) . Once
again, the incumbent can recover the industry proﬁt minus this secured proﬁt πR through
the franchise fee. It will therefore set wholesale prices equal to its marginal costs (wH = cI
and wL = c), and charge a franchise fee such that
π







M (∅,c) − π
M (∅,c E) − π
M (cE,c).




M (∅,c E) − π
M (cE,c).
In order to decide whether to force the retailer to buy its complete line of products (FLF)
or to let the entrant be active in the ﬁrst period (A), the incumbent compares this proﬁt
πI(FLF), with the proﬁt πI(A) given by proposition 4. This leads to the following result:
Proposition 5 The incumbent manufacturer decides to produce both types of goods and
thus ties their sales if and only if entry would decrease the inter-temporal industry proﬁt,
that is when cE ≥ cM
E , where c<c M














M (cI,c) ⇔ ∆(c
M
E )=0 .
Proof. The two proﬁts the incumbent compares are:
πI(FLF)=2 π
M(cI,c) − π
M (∅,c E) − π
M (cE,c)a n dπI(A)=π
M(cI,c E) − π
M(∅,c E).
15We show in appendix C that full-line forcing does strictly better (from the incumbent’s point of view)
that product-speciﬁc two-part tariﬀs.
14Therefore
πI(FLF) ≥ πI(A) ⇔ π
M (cE,c)+π
M(cI,c E) ≤ 2π
M(cI,c) ⇔ ∆(cE) ≤ 0.
The left hand term of the inequality is a decreasing function of the entrant’s cost cE.
Moreover, this inequality is not satisﬁed for cE = c
¡
πM (c,c) ≥ πM(cI,c)
¢
, but is satisﬁed
for cE = cI
¡
πM(cI,c I) ≤ πM(cI,c)
¢
.
The existence of a comprehensive portfolio of brands (for example following a merger
between the incumbent and one of the competitive producers) creates incentives for full-
line forcing and allows the holder of such portfolio to strategically deter entry to maintain
its monopoly position on the highly proﬁtable market.
The portfolio of brands creates incentives for tying, as this helps the incumbent to
reduce the retailer’s rent in the same spirit as Shaﬀer (1991). Full-line forcing eliminates
the retailer’s capacity to select the products it resells thereby eliminating such rents. In
the absence of any entry threat (i.e. no potential entrant), the monopolist I has no
incentives to produce the low-demand good as it cannot extend its monopoly power on
this market. Potential entry slightly modiﬁes the analysis. It is now necessary to consider
the interactions between the incumbent, the entrant and the retailer, the role of the
competitive fringe being limited. The relevant outside option to be considered is now the
joint proﬁt that the entrant and the retailer could make in the absence of the incumbent,
that is, πM (∅,c E)+πM (cE,c). If the incumbent can force the retailer to buy its complete
line of products, it ensures that the retailer only earns this reservation proﬁt only. If it is
legally obliged to oﬀer two diﬀerent tariﬀs, it has to convince the retailer to sell not only
its high-demand good but also its low-demand product instead of the entrant’s product.
Despite being more eﬃcient than the entrant on the low-demand market (which allows it
to deter entry if the entrant’s cost is too close from cI), the retailer’s capacity to choose
the products it proposes on its shelves is restored and the incumbent has to give up a rent
to ensure that the retailer sells its generic product. Tying eliminates this rent thereby
restoring the incumbent’s monopoly power.
Moreover, the portfolio of brand allows the incumbent to deter entry and maintain its
monopoly. When it only produces the high-demand good, the incumbent cannot deter
entry, because the retailer always has incentives to resell the entrant’s product (at least an
inﬁnitesimal quantity) in order to increase its second period proﬁt. Tying reinforces the
incumbent’s bargaining position. If the retailer decides to reject the incumbent’s oﬀer,
it forsakes the opportunity of proposing the high-demand product on its shelves. If the
15entrant is suﬃciently eﬃcient, the pair entrant-retailer has a lot to gain in the second
period by selling the entrant’s good on the low-demand market in the ﬁrst period. The
extra proﬁt can then compensate for the absence of a high-demand product during the
ﬁrst period. In that case, it is too expensive for the incumbent to deter entry. But if
the entrant’s production cost is large enough, the beneﬁt to the retailer is low in the
second period and entry deterrence is therefore not very costly. It is thus a proﬁtable
strategy since the second period gain (the incumbent maintains its monopoly position)
compensates for the cost of deterrence. The incumbent therefore decides to force the
retailer to sell its complete line of products.
6W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
Let us now analyze the eﬀects of the comprehensive portfolio on the social welfare. The
only relevant the incumbent actually uses its new bargaining power and ties the sales of
the two products to protect its monopoly position. This happens only when the entrant
is not eﬃcient enough, more precisely when entry would not increase the proﬁto ft h e
industry. The ”portfolio eﬀect” on the total proﬁts is thus positive.
For the consumers, the eﬀect is however ambiguous. If entry does not occur because
of full-line forcing, the impact on consumers’ surplus is positive in the ﬁrst period. The
low-product good is indeed produced by the incumbent at lower cost than the entrant’s
production cost, and retail prices are therefore lower (pM
H (cI,c)a n dpM
L (cI,c), instead of
pM
H (cI,c E)a n dpM
L (cI,c E)). In the second period, the incumbent maintains its monopoly
position on the high-demand market, and the eﬀect on consumer surplus is therefore
negative: prices stay at a higher level (pM
H (cI,c)a n dpM
L (cI,c)) than if entry had occurred
(pM
H (cE,c)a n dpM
L (cE,c)). The global eﬀe c ti st h u sa m b i g u o u s . T h i se ﬀect would be
positive for very low values of cE:i nt h i sc a s e ,t h eﬁrst period negative eﬀect is almost
null. However, this is exactly when the incumbent does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce
the low-demand good and to use its portfolio power. The total eﬀect on inter-temporal
consumer surplus decreases when cE, and it is thus impossible to draw general conclusions
when cE is higher to cM
E .
It is nevertheless possible to determine this sign of the eﬀect for speciﬁc functional
forms of the demand functions. If, for example, demands are linear, consumers’ surplus
i si n d e e de q u a lt oh a l fo ft h em o n o p o l yp r o ﬁt. The incumbent produces both goods and
ties their sales in order to exclude the competitor if and only if entry is not proﬁtable
16from the perspective of the aggregate monopoly proﬁt. In that case, the existence of a
portfolio of brands and foreclosure lead to higher monopoly proﬁts and therefore to higher
consumers’ surplus. Tying is proﬁtable for the incumbent only if it is socially proﬁtable.
An other case, is when the two markets are completely independent, that is, when
the demand in one market depends only on the price of that product. In this case the
”monopoly” proﬁt πM (wH,w L) is simply the sum of the ”monopoly” proﬁts for each of







Using these notations, we can reconsider our previous analysis: entry is not eﬃcient, and
”portfolio power” thus occurs when
π
M
H (cE) − π
M
H (cI) ≤ π
M
L (c) − π
M
L (cE),
that is when the beneﬁts of entry on the high-demand market (in the second period) are
lower than the loss on the low-demand market. The eﬀe c to nc o n s u m e rs u r p l u sc a na l s o
be decomposed in two parts: the eﬀect on market H and the eﬀect on market L. The


















It is in general impossible to conclude, but if the demand functions on each market are
iso-elastic (and we denote by εH and εL the elasticities on market H and L respectively),






































This shows that the eﬀect can be either positive or negative depending on the relative
sizes of the price elasticities of demand on the two markets. In particular, it is more likely
to be negative (resp. positive) when the demand on the high-demand market is relatively
more elastic than the demand on the low-demand market.
177C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has shown that full-line forcing can be used in order to maintain the monopoly
p o w e ro nt h ep r i m a r ym a r k e t . T h ei d e ai st h a tai n c u m b e n tm o n o p o l i s tc a nt r yt ob e
active in a diﬀerent but related market (substitutable goods) in order to avoid entry in
this related market. The objective is not to extend its monopoly to this secondary market,
but to make sure that a more eﬃcient entrant will not have access to its monopolized
and highly proﬁtable market in the future. Although our framework is diﬀerent since
ﬁrms have to sell their goods through a monopolized retail sector and thus do not directly
compete for consumers, our results can been seen as an extension to Carlton and Waldman
(2002) to the case of imperfectly substitutable goods.
Although our analysis do not allows us to conclude that ”portfolio power” is always
harmful for the consumers in our context, we think that the results raise an important
question in merger control. The welfare analysis of portfolio eﬀects shows that the impact
on consumer surplus can be either positive or negative demand on the speciﬁc form of
the demand functions. Moreover, even when the two markets are independent, the eﬀect
can still be either positive or negative depending the relative sizes of the price elasticities
of demand. This suggests that the analysis of conglomerate mergers cannot be limited to
the computation of the diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts h a r e so rt h eH e r ﬁndhal index (and thus to the
deﬁnition of the product and geographic markets).
An important feature of our model is the structure of the retail market. Since this
market is monopolized, the unique retailer plays an important role in preventing the in-
cumbent manufacturer to use its portfolio in order to prevent eﬃcient entry. The existence
of buyer power makes it therefore less likely for the ”portfolio power” to have a negative
impact on consumer surplus. The results would probably be slightly diﬀerent if the retail
market was to be more competitive. Let us for think of what is likely to happen if the
producers compete directly for consumers. In this case, a portfolio of product could be
used to make ”predation” more eﬃcient. The incumbent manufacturer can use its two
prices to make it impossible for the entrant to access the low demand market in the ﬁrst
place: by selling at a very low price on this low demand market, it imposes to the entrant
to make huge losses in the ﬁrst period. If the entrant is not eﬃcient enough, these losses
would easily be larger than the potential second period beneﬁts. Although, the welfare
eﬀect are not clear (we have again a positive eﬀect in the ﬁrst period due to the predatory
behaviour), the ”portfolio power” eﬀect seems much more likely to be negative. This
18suggests that the potential for anti-competitive practices after the merger (between the
incumbent and a low-demand product manufacturer) strongly depends on the existence
of some buyer power. This seems to be in line with some of the European Commission’s
conclusions in the GMG case.
Providing an exhaustive analysis of the validity of the ”portfolio eﬀect” theory was
far beyond the scope of this paper. We believe however, that it provides a useful counter-
argument to the view that this theory cannot have any economic foundations, and that,
although tying might have anti-competitive eﬀects, it cannot be proﬁt a b l yu s e di ne q u i -
librium. We think that our results conﬁrm that ”portfolio power” may arise and have
harmful eﬀects for the consumers and should therefore be analyzed in detail when it
appears to be necessary. However, this theory has to be handled with care by the com-
petition authorities since the eﬀects might also be positive for both the ﬁrms and the
consumers.
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21AP r o o f o f L e m m a 3
In order to deter entry, the producer I has to ensure that the retailer is never willing to
sell even an inﬁnitesimal quantity of the entrant’s product on the low-demand market,
even if the entrant is ready to give its technology to the retailer for free (or alternatively
is ready to sell its good at marginal cost in the two periods). Only one option is available:
the producer I has to convince the retailer to distribute its product and the competitive
fringe’s low-demand product. The other two alternatives are indeed impossible to realize;
they involve convincing the retailer to distribute only:
• its product H : the retailer would always prefer to sell an inﬁnitesimal quantity of
the entrant’s product as this does not aﬀect its ﬁrst period proﬁt
¡
πM (wI,∅) − FI
¢
but strictly increases its future proﬁt( πM (cE,c) au lieu de πM (∅,c)).
• the competitive fringe’s product: this would violate assumption (H2).
If the retailer distributes the incumbent’s and the competitive fringe’s products, its
total proﬁti s :
π(I + CF)=π
M (wI,c) − FI + π
M (∅,c).
If it tries to distribute a strictly positive quantity of the entrant’s product; it resell either
an inﬁnitesimal quantity, or qM



















M (wI,c E) − FI + π
M (cE,c).
The incumbent can therefore deter entry only if:
π
M (wI,c) − π
M (wI,∅) ≥ π
M (∅,c)+π
M (cE,c)( 1 )
and π
M (wI,c) − π
M (wI,c E) ≥ π
M (∅,c)+π
M (cE,c). (2)






This imply that the the left-hand terms of the two equations (1) and (2) are increasing





and this would contradict the assumption (H2).
22B Proof of Proposition 4
The ﬁxed fees FI and FE have to satisfy the following constraints:
π











M (∅,c E) − FE + π
2
D(E)( 5 )
Conditions (4) and (5) determine the maximum franchises the producers can charge. We
thus have:
FI ≤ π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (∅,c E)a n dFE ≤ π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (∅,c).
In both cases, the maximum fee is equal to the additional surplus (cumulated over the
two periods) generated by the product. If these two constraints are satisﬁed, the third
condition (3) is satisﬁed if and only if:
π
M(cI,c E) − π
M(∅,c E) ≤ π
M(cI,c) − π
M(∅,c). (6)






Since cE is larger than c, (6) cannot be satisﬁed and (3) is therefore binding.The franchise
fees must then satisfy the following three conditions:
FI + FE = π
M(cI,c E)+π
M(cI,c) − 2π
M (∅,c)( 7 )
FI ≤ π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (∅,c E)( 8 )
FE ≤ π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (∅,c)( 9 )
The incumbent makes the ﬁrst oﬀer and can therefore set its franchise fee such that the
constraint (8) is binding. The entrant then sets its fee in order to satisfy the condition
(7).
C Product-speciﬁcT w o - p a r tT a r i ﬀs
In this section, we show that the incumbent cannot replicate the proﬁt πI(FLF)( p r o p o -
sition 5) if it cannot tie the sales of the two products.16 In order to get πI(FLF)w i t h
16Notice that this section is relevant only if full-line forcing occurs, that is if cE >c M
E .
23two product-speciﬁct w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀs, the incumbent has set wholesale prices equal to its
marginal production costs (wH = cI and wL = c) in order to ensure that the retailer will
then maximize the industry proﬁt, and set franchise fees such that:
FH + FL = FHL(FLF)=π
M(cI,c)+π
M (∅,c) − π
M (∅,c E) − π
M (cE,c).
Moreover, the franchise fees must be set in order to ensure that the retailer accepts both
oﬀers, even though the entrant is willing to give up its technology (or makes the oﬀer
wE = cE and FE = −π2
E(E)). The following three constraints must therefore be satisﬁed:
π





M (cI,c E) − FH + π
M (cE,c) (11)
≥ π
M (∅,c) − FL + π
M (∅,c) (12)
Condition (10) guarantees that the retailer accepts both oﬀers rather than only the en-
trant’s oﬀer. Constraint (12) ensures that the retailer prefers to resell both the incum-
bent’s products rather than just the incumbent’s low-demand product, whilst condition
(11) ensures that it does not prefer to only resell the high-demand product. Conditions
(10), (11) and (12) deﬁne constraints on the franchise fees:
FH ≤ π




M (∅,c) − π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (cE,c);
FH + FL = π
M(cI,c)+π
M (∅,c) − π
M (∅,c E) − π
M (cE,c).
which imply:
FH + FL ≤ 2π
M (cI,c) − π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (cE,c);
and FH + FL = π
M(cI,c)+π
M (∅,c) − π
M (∅,c E) − π
M (cE,c).
These two conditions are simultaneously satisﬁed only if:
π
M (cI,c) − π
M (∅,c) ≥ π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (∅,c E) ⇔ cE ≤ c.
This shows that, with product-speciﬁc two-part tariﬀs, the incumbent can never obtain
the same proﬁt as it can with full-line forcing.
24